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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Ray V. Caprio filed a complaint against 
Defendant Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC 
(“HRRG”), alleging two claims under the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).  Caprio appeals from 
the order of the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey granting HRRG‟s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  We will vacate the District Court‟s order and will 





 It is uncontested that “HRRG is primarily in the 
business of acquiring and/or collecting debts that are 
allegedly due to another.”  (JA Vol. II at 6.)  HRRG therefore 
acknowledges that, at least in certain circumstances, it may 
fall under the FDCPA‟s definition of a “debt collector.”  See 
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (“The term „debt collector‟ means any 
person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce 
or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is 
the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or 
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due 
or asserted to be owed or due another.”).  This case arose out 
of a December 7, 2010 letter that HRRG sent to Caprio in an 
attempt to collect an alleged debt that Caprio owed to another.   
 
 The body of this one-page and double-sided 
“Collection Letter” consisted of the following four 
paragraphs: 
 
The health care provider(s) listed below, 
recently hired Healthcare Revenue Recovery 
Group, LLC (HRRG) to collect the balance on 
this account.  Our client‟s records show you as 
the person responsible for payment of the 
charges for PHYSICIAN SERVICES. 
 
If we can answer any questions, or if you feel 
you do not owe this amount, please call us toll 
free at 800-984-9115 or write us at the above 
address.  This is an attempt to collect a debt.  Any 
information obtained will be used for that purpose.  
(NOTICE:  SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION.)  
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You may send payment in full.  Just fill in your 
credit card information on the reverse, or 
enclose your check/money order payable to the 
creditor along with the payment voucher 
below.  The reply envelope provided needs no 
postage.  Unless specified, your payment will 
be applied to the oldest balance first. 
 
We hope to have your full cooperation in this 
collection matter. 
 
(JA Vol. II at 16.) 
 
 The letterhead (on the left side at the top of the 
document) included a stylized “HRRG” logo and, in all 
capital letters and in a seemingly larger font than the body of 
the Collection Letter, a Florida post office box mailing 
address.  Using an even larger font, the letterhead (on the 
right side at the top of the document) also included the same 
toll-free telephone number provided in the second paragraph.  
A Spanish-language toll-free telephone number, evidently in 
the same font size used for the mailing address, appeared 
right below this number.  Furthermore, the Collection Letter 
included both HRRG‟s web address (“hrrgcollections.com”) 
as well as the following subject line:  “Re:  JIM002 
Validation Notification.”  (Id.)  The bottom part of the 
Collection Letter then consisted of a detachable payment slip 
with an Ohio post office box mailing address and a space for 
the “Amount Enclosed.”  This slip expressly identified the 
creditor (“EMER PHY ASSOC NORTH JERS”), the account 
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numbers, the debtor‟s name (“Regarding CAPRIO, RAY 
V.”), the amount owed (“$49.51”), and the service date 
(“07/06/10”) .  There was a form to provide credit card (and 
insurance) information on the reverse side of the slip. 
 
 The reverse side of the Collection Letter (at the center 
of the page above the slip) contained the following statement, 
apparently in the same (or at least a very similar) font size as 
the letterhead‟s mailing address: 
 
This is an attempt to collect a debt from a debt 
collection agency. 
Any information obtained will be used for that 
purpose. 
 
Pursuant to Sec. 809 of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, unless you notify this office 
within 30 days after receiving this notice that 
you dispute the validity of this debt or any 
portion thereof, this office will assume this debt 
is valid.  If you notify this office in writing 
within 30 days from receiving this notice that 
you dispute the validity of this debt or any 
portion thereof, this office will:  obtain 
verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a 
judgement [sic] and mail you a copy of such 
judgement [sic] or verification.  If you request 
this office in writing within 30 days after 
receiving this notice, this office will provide 
you with the name and address of the original 
creditor, if different from the current creditor. 
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(Id. at 17.)  This statement is known as the “Validation 
Notice.” 
 
 Based on this Collection Letter, Caprio filed a putative 
class action complaint under the FDCPA.  He specifically 
alleged that HRRG violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g because “the 
least sophisticated consumer would believe that he should 
choose either of the instructions as set forth in the second 
paragraph of the notice and either call the toll free number or 
write to HRRG at the address on the letter, to dispute the 
alleged debt.”  (Id. at 11.)  However, a dispute of a debt must 
be in writing in order to be effective in this Circuit.  HRRG 
also allegedly violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by “providing 
language that misrepresents to the least sophisticated 
consumer that she can call [sic] either call the toll free 
number or write to HRRG at the address on the letter, to 
dispute the alleged debt, when in fact she must dispute the 
alleged debt in writing for the dispute to be effective.”  (Id. at 
12.)   
 
 After filing its answer, HRRG moved for judgment on 
the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(c).  The District Court then granted HRRG‟s motion.  See 
Caprio v. HRRG, Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-2877 (DMC) 




 The District Court had jurisdiction over this FDCPA 
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This Court has 
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appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 A district court‟s order granting a Rule 12(c) motion 
for judgment on the pleadings is generally reviewed under a 
plenary standard.  See, e.g., Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Squires, 667 F.3d 388, 390 (3d Cir. 2012).  In turn, a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings based on the theory that the 
plaintiff failed to state a claim is reviewed under the same 
standards that apply to a motion to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See, e.g., Revell v. Port. 
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 995 (2011).  In order to survive a motion to 
dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
which if accepted as true, states a facially plausible claim for 
relief.  Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
 The current appeal generally presents this Court with a 
legal inquiry.  In particular, “whether language in a collection 
letter contradicts or overshadows the validation notice is a 
question of law.”  Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 




A. The § 1692g Claim 
 
 Both the District Court as well as the parties 
themselves devote most of their attention to Caprio‟s claim 
under § 1692g.  Although presenting us with an unusual set of 
circumstances, we ultimately conclude that the District Court 
committed reversible error by granting judgment on the 
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pleadings in favor of HRRG as to this § 1692g claim.     
 
  Section 1692g(a) specifically requires a debt collector 
to provide the following information to the debtor: 
 
(1) the amount of the debt; 
  
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is 
owed; 
 
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within 
thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes 
the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, 
the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt 
collector; 
 
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the 
debt collector in writing within the thirty-day 
period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is 
disputed, the debt collector will obtain 
verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment 
against the consumer and a copy of such 
verification or judgment will be mailed to the 
consumer by the debt collector; and 
 
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer‟s 
written request within the thirty-day period, the 
debt collector will provide the consumer with 
the name and address of the original creditor, if 
different from the current creditor. 
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“Paragraphs 3 through 5 of section 1692g(a) contain the 
validation notice—the statements that inform the consumer 
how to obtain verification of the debt and that he has thirty 
days in which to do so.”  Wilson, 225 F.3d at 353-54.  Section 
1692g(b) then states, in part, that: 
 
If the consumer notifies the debt collector in 
writing within the thirty-day period described in 
subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or 
any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the 
consumer requests the name and address of the 
original creditor, the debt collector shall cease 
collection of the debt, or any disputed portion 
thereof, until the debt collector obtains 
verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, 
or the name and address of the original creditor, 
and a copy of such verification or judgment, or 
name and address of the original creditor, is 
mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.  
Collection activities and communications that 
do not otherwise violate this subchapter may 
continue during the 30-day period referred to in 
subsection (a) of this section unless the 
consumer has notified the debt collector in 
writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, 
is disputed or that the consumer requests the 
name and address of the original creditor. . . .  
 
Accordingly, a debt collector must “cease all collection 
efforts if the consumer provides written notice that he or she 
disputes the debt or requests the name of the original creditor 
 10 
until the debt collector mails either the debt verification or 
creditor‟s name to the consumer.”  Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354 
(citing § 1692g(b)); see also Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 
107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Subsection (b) states that if the 
debtor disputes the debt in writing within thirty days, the debt 
collector must cease collection efforts until the debt collector 
has verified the debt.” (footnote omitted)).  In Graziano v. 
Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991), we specifically 
concluded that “subsection (a)(3), like subsections (a)(4) and 
(a)(5), contemplates that any dispute, to be effective, must be 
in writing,” id. at 112. 
 
 Congress adopted “the debt validation provisions of 
section 1692g” to guarantee that consumers would receive 
“adequate notice” of their rights under the FDCPA.  Wilson, 
225 F.3d at 354 (citing Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, 
Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991)).  More broadly, the 
FDCPA was enacted in order to eliminate abusive debt 
collection practices, which contribute to the number of 
personal bankruptcies, marital instability, loss of 
employment, and invasions of privacy.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 
1692(a), (e); Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 
650 F.3d 993, 996 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1143 (2012); Wilson, 225 F.3d at 484. Another important 
purpose of this legislation was to insure that those debt 
collectors who refrain from using such practices are not 
competitively disadvantaged.  See, e.g., § 1692(e); Lesher, 
650 F.3d at 996.  As remedial legislation, the FDCPA must be 
broadly construed in order to give full effect to these 
purposes.  See, e.g., Lesher, 650 F.3d at 997; Brown v. Card 
Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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 In Graziano and Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 
350 (3d Cir. 2000), we specifically considered whether or not 
debt collection correspondence violated § 1692g.  Simply put, 
“statutory notice must not only explicate a debtor‟s rights; it 
must do so effectively.”  Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111.  “In order 
to comply with the requirements of section 1692g, more is 
required than the mere inclusion of the statutory debt 
validation notice in the debt collection letter—the required 
notice must also be conveyed effectively to the debtor.”  
Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354 (citing Payco-General, 225 F.3d at 
484).  The validation notice accordingly “must be in print 
sufficiently large to be read, and must be sufficiently 
prominent.”  Graziano, 990 F.2d at 111 (citing Swanson v. 
Southern Oregon Credit Serv., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 
1988)).  “More importantly for present purposes, the notice 
must not be overshadowed or contradicted by accompanying 
messages from the debt collector.”  Id.  In other words, “a 
collection letter will not meet the requirements of the Act 
where the validation notice is printed on the back and the 
front of the letter does not contain any reference to the notice” 
or, more generally, where “the validation notice is 
overshadowed or contradicted by accompanying messages or 
notices from the debt collector.”  Wilson, 225 F.3d at 355 
(citing Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111; Payco-General, 943 F.2d at 
484). 
 
 Amended by Congress in 2006, § 1692g(b) now 
expressly provides that “[a]ny collection activities and 
communication during the 30-day period may not 
overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the 
consumer‟s right to dispute the debt or request the name and 
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address of the original creditor.”  We note that this 
amendment has generally been viewed as a codification of the 
“overshadowed or contradicted” rule or gloss previously 
adopted by the courts themselves.  See, e.g., McMurray v. 
Procollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 669 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Zemeckis  v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 679 F.3d 632, 
635 n.1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 584 (2012); Ellis v. 
Solomon & Solomon, P.C., 591 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 
We have turned to the well-established “least 
sophisticated debtor” standard in order to determine whether 
or not the required validation notice was “overshadowed or 
contradicted” by other messages or notices from the debt 
collector.  See, e.g., Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354; Graziano, 950 
F.2d at 111.  “„The basic purpose of the least-sophisticated 
[debtor] standard is to ensure that the FDCPA protects all 
consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.  This standard 
is consistent with the norms that courts have traditionally 
applied in consumer-protection law.‟”  Lesher, 650 F.3d at 
997 (quoting Brown, 464 F.3d at 453) (alteration in original).  
“As the [Sixth Circuit] explained in [Smith v. Computer 
Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1999)], the „least 
sophisticated debtor‟ standard is „lower than simply 
examining whether particular language would deceive or 
mislead a reasonable debtor.‟”  Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354 
(quoting Smith, 167 F.3d at 1054).  In other words, “[t]his 
standard is less demanding than one that inquires whether a 
particular communication would mislead or deceive a 
reasonable debtor.”  Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Mgmt., 
Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Brown, 464 
F.3d at 455).  Nevertheless, “the standard does not go so far 
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as to provide solace to the willfully blind or non-observant.”  
Id. at 299.  The debtor is still held to a quotient of 
reasonableness, a basic level of understanding, and a 
willingness to read with care, and the debt collector 
accordingly cannot be held liable for bizarre or idiosyncratic 
interpretations.  See, e.g., Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354-55.  For 
example, even the “least sophisticated debtor” is expected to 
read any notice in its entirety.   See, e.g., Lesher, 650 F.3d at 
997. 
 
As we pointed out in Wilson, the Second Circuit 
“ruled that a validation notice „is overshadowing or 
contradictory if it would make the least sophisticated 
consumer uncertain as to her rights.‟”  Wilson, 225 F.3d at 
354 (quoting Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d 
Cir. 1996)).  “The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
elaborated that a collection letter „is deceptive when it can be 
reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one 
of which is inaccurate.‟”  Id. (quoting Russell, 74 F.3d at 35). 
 
As the District Court indicated, the Validation Notice 
on the reverse side of HRRG‟s Collection Letter—at least 
when viewed in isolation—satisfied this statutory scheme.  
“Further, the Collection Letter does not threaten or encourage 
Plaintiff to waive his statutory right to challenge the validity 
of the debt.”  Caprio, 2012 WL 847486, at *4.  In fact, we 
considered such claims of improper threats or demands in 
Graziano as well as Wilson. 
 
 We specifically concluded in Graziano that “the 
juxtaposition of two inconsistent statements . . . rendered the 
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statutory notice invalid under section 1692g.”  Graziano, 950 
F.2d at 111.  The debt collector‟s notice “threatened legal 
action within ten days unless the debt was resolved in that 
time” and included, at the bottom of the page, “the phrase 
„See reverse side for information regarding your legal 
rights!‟”  Id. at 109.  The required validation notice then 
appeared on the reverse side of this document.  Id.  We held 
that there was “a reasonable probability that the least 
sophisticated debtor, faced with a demand for payment within 
ten days and a threat of immediate legal action if payment is 
not made in that time, would be induced to overlook his 
statutory right to dispute the debt within thirty days.”  Id. at 
111 (citing Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225-26).  “A notice of 
rights, when presented in conjunction with such a 
contradictory demand, is not effectively communicated to the 
debtor.”  Id. 
 
 We then reached the opposite conclusion in Wilson, 
holding that “neither the form nor the substance of 
Quadramed‟s letter overshadowed or contradicted the 
validation notice.”  Wilson, 225 F.3d at 361.  This debt 
collection letter stated that “„[o]ur client has placed your 
account with us for immediate collection‟” and that “„[w]e 
shall afford you the opportunity to pay this bill immediately 
and avoid further action against you.‟”  Id. at 352.  The next 
paragraph added that, “„[t]o insure immediate credit to your 
account, make your check or money order payable to ERI‟” 
and directed the debtor to “„[b]e sure to include the top 
portion of this statement and place your account number on 
your remittance.‟”  Id.  The required validation notice 
appeared in the letter‟s third and final paragraph.   Id.  While 
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recognizing that this letter presented “a close question,” we 
ultimately were “not convinced that the language in the first 
two paragraphs overshadows or contradicts the validation 
notice such that the „least sophisticated debtor‟ would be 
confused or mislead [sic] as to his rights to dispute or seek 
validation of the debt.”  Id. at 353. We reached this 
conclusion based on our interpretation of both the “form” and 
the “substance” of the letter: 
 
First of all, upon review of the physical 
characteristics and form of the letter, we have 
concluded that the first two paragraphs of the 
letter do not overshadow the validation notice.  
The validation notice was presented in the same 
font, size and color type-face as the first two 
paragraphs of the letter.  Moreover, the required 
notice was set forth on the front page of the 
letter immediately following the two paragraphs 
that Wilson contends overshadow and 
contradict the validation notice.  Accordingly, 
Wilson‟s overshadowing claim must fail. 
 
 Second, an actual or apparent 
contradiction between the first two paragraphs 
and the third one containing the validation 
notice does not exist here.  Unlike the collection 
letter in Graziano, which demanded payment 
within ten days and threatened immediate legal 
action if payment was not made in that time, 
Quadramed‟s letter makes no such demand or 
threat.  Instead, Wilson is presented with two 
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options:  (1) an opportunity to pay the debt 
immediately and avoid further action, or (2) 
notify Quadramed within thirty days after 
receiving the collection letter that he disputes 
the validity of the debt.  As written, the letter 
does not emphasize one option over the other, 
or suggest that Wilson forego the second option 
in favor of immediate payment.  Thus, we find 
the least sophisticated debtor would not be 
induced to overlook his statutory right to 
dispute the debt within thirty days. 
 
Id. at 356 (footnote omitted). 
 
 Caprio‟s own case against HRRG rests on the “please 
call” language contained in the second paragraph of the body 
of the Collection Letter:  “If we can answer any questions, or 
if you feel you do not owe this amount, please call us toll free 
at 800-984-9115 or write us at the above address.”  (JA Vol. 
II at 16.)  In contrast to the debtors in Graziano and Wilson, 
Caprio claims that HRRG‟s Collection Letter violated § 
1692g because the least sophisticated debtor could reasonably 
believe that he could effectively dispute the validity of the 
debt by making a telephone call, even though such disputes 
must be made in writing in order to be effective in this 
Circuit.  The District Court, however, concluded that the 
“please call” language, when read in the context of the entire 
Collection Letter as a whole, would not confuse the “least 
sophisticated debtor.”  According to the District Court, “[t]he 
Collection Letter clearly and accurately sets forth all of the 
required validation notice language, and the language on the 
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front does not overshadow or contradict that validation 
notice.”  Caprio, 2012 WL 847486, at *5. 
 
 Based on our own interpretation of the Collection 
Letter from the perspective of the applicable “least 
sophisticated debtor,” we nevertheless determine that both the 
“substance” as well as the “form” of this Collection Letter 
overshadowed and contradicted the Validation Notice.  See 
Wilson, 225 F.3d at 361. 
 
 We do acknowledge that this “please call” language 
could be read as nothing more than a mere invitation given 
other aspects of the Collection Letter.  In fact, the District 
Court may be correct that “[a] more appropriate reading of 
the Collection Letter reveals that the language on the front of 
the letter reflects an invitation to communicate, and the 
validation notice on the back of the letter sets forth the 
Plaintiff‟s rights.”  Caprio, 2012 WL 847486, at *5.  The 
short paragraph containing this “please call” language 
actually included the following instruction:  “(NOTICE:  SEE 
REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION.)”  
(JA Vol. II at 16.)  Already “charged with reading the 
Collection Letter in its entirety,” Caprio, 2012 WL 847486, at 
*5 (citing Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 298), Caprio 
would then find the required Validation Notice on this 
“REVERSE SIDE.”  As the District Court also noted, the 
Collection Letter did not expressly state that a telephone call 
would be sufficient to dispute the debt. 
 
 However, it is not our responsibility to decide whether 
the debtor or the debt collector offers “a more appropriate 
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reading” of a debt collection letter.  We instead must interpret 
the document from the perspective of “least sophisticated 
debtor.”  Designed to protect naïve and even gullible 
individuals, “the „least sophisticated debtor‟ standard is 
„lower than simply examining whether particular language 
would deceive or mislead a reasonable debtor.‟”  Wilson, 225 
F.3d at 354 (quoting Smith, 167 F.3d at 1054). 
 
 Pursuant to this standard, we begin with the 
“substance” of the Collection Letter sent out by HRRG.  This 
document instructed Caprio to call or write “if you feel you 
do not owe this amount.”  (JA Vol. II at 16.)  At the very 
least, the “least sophisticated debtor” could reasonably “feel” 
that he or she “do[es] not owe this amount” if he or she 
actually disputed the debt and its validity.  If so, this “please 
call” language basically instructed such a debtor to call or 
write in order to dispute the debt itself.  While he or she 
certainly could (and, in actuality, must) raise a debt dispute in 
writing, it is well established that a telephone call is not a 
legally effective alternative for disputing the debt.  See 
Graziano, 950 F.2d at 112. 
 
 With respect to the “form” of HRRG‟s Collection 
Letter, we observe that even more attention was then drawn to 
this deficient alternative because both the words “please call” 
and the toll-free telephone number itself were printed in bold.  
This telephone number appeared again in the letterhead at the 
top of the Collection Letter in an even larger font.  In 
contrast, no such bold print was used in either the phrase 
“write us at the above address” or in the Validation Notice.  
Likewise, HRRG‟s mailing address only appeared in the 
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letterhead, where it was actually printed in a smaller font than 
HRRG‟s toll-free telephone number.  We also note that—
unlike the “please call” language—the required Validation 
Notice was relegated to the back side of the Collection Letter.  
Especially given these circumstances, it appears more likely 
that the “least sophisticated debtor” would take the easier—
but legally ineffective—alternative of making a toll-free 
telephone call to dispute the debt instead of going to the 
trouble of drafting and then mailing a written dispute. 
 
 We therefore conclude that the Collection Letter was 
deceptive because “„it can be reasonably read to have two or 
more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate,‟” i.e., 
that Caprio could dispute the debt by making a telephone call.  
Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354 (quoting Russell, 74 F.3d at 35).  In 
short, the Validation Notice was overshadowed and 
contradicted because the “least sophisticated debtor” would 
be “„uncertain as to her rights.‟”  Id. (quoting Russell, 74 F.3d 
at 35). 
 
 The District Court was also “persuaded by the 
holdings of other courts addressing similar issues.”  Caprio, 
2012 WL 847486, at *4.  However, it appears that HRRG‟s 
own Collection Letter “is distinguishable from the collection 
letters at issue in” this prior case law.  See Wilson, 225 F.3d 
at 357. 
 
 For instance, the District Court and HRRG, like this 
Court in Wilson, id. at 359-60, have turned to a ruling by the 
Ninth Circuit.  In Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 
1997), the debt collection letter stated in its second paragraph 
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that, “„[u]nless an immediate telephone call is made to J. 
SCOTT, a collection assistant of our office at (602) 258-8433, 
we may find it necessary to recommend to our client that they 
proceed with legal action,‟” id. at 1434.  Citing to Graziano 
and a number of other cases, the Ninth Circuit observed that 
“[e]very other circuit that has concluded that section 1692g 
was violated, in which the least sophisticated debtor standard 
is applied involved a written communication containing 
language regarding payment of the alleged debt that 
contradicted or overshadowed the validation notice.”  Id. at 
1433 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Nat‟l Fin. 
Servs, Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 1996); Russell, 74 F.3d 
at 34; Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111; Payco-General, 943 F.2d at 
484).  “In each of these cases, payment was demanded within 
a time period less than the statutory thirty days granted to 
dispute the debt and this demand was communicated in a 
format that emphasized the duty to make payment, and 
obscured the fact that the debtor had thirty days to dispute the 
debt.”  Id. (citing Nat‟l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 139; Russell, 
74 F.3d at 32; Graziano, 950 F.2d at 109; Payco-General, 943 
F.2d at 483); see also Wilson, 225 F.3d at 359-60 
(summarizing Terran‟s account of prior case law).  In any 
case, the Terran court ultimately determined that the 
challenged language “simply encourages the debtor to 
communicate with the debt collection agency” and “does not 
threaten or encourage the least sophisticated debtor to waive 
his statutory right to challenge the validity of the debt.”  
Terran, 109 F.3d at 1434.  In contrast, HRRG‟s Collection 
Letter did more than merely ask Caprio to call or write if “we 
can answer any questions.”  (JA Vol. II at 16.)  It also asked 
him to “please call us toll free at 800-984-9115 or write us at 
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the above address” if “you feel you do not owe this amount.”   
(Id.)  In addition, the text of the Terran letter was presented in 
the same ordinary font and without any particular emphasis 
(with the exception of the debtor‟s name and the name of the 
person to contact), and the required validation notice 
appeared on the front side of the document (in the third and 
final paragraph).
1
  Terran, 109 F.3d at 1434. 
                                                 
1
  We further note that the Second Circuit specifically 
considered a claim that a letter violated § 1692g because it 
asked the debtor to telephone the debt collector even though a 
telephone call is not sufficient to preserve the debtor‟s rights 
under FDCPA.  The debt collection letter in Miller v. 
Wolpoff & Abrahamson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2003), 
stated, inter alia, that “„[a]fter you have read the important 
notice on the reverse side of this letter, if appropriate please 
call our office to resolve this matter,‟” id. at 296.  In addition 
to including a validation notice on the reverse side of the 
document, “the front of the letter instructs the recipient that 
„[w]hen paying the balance in full or if you are unable to call 
our office, check one of the options below and return the 
bottom portion of this letter . . . .‟”  Id. at 310 (alteration in 
original).  “While the options detailed on the bottom of the 
letter do not include requesting validation of the debt, the 
bottom of the letter states in large-print, capital letters, 
„BEFORE RESPONDING TO THIS LETTER SEE 
REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT NOTICE.‟”  Id.  The 
Second Circuit ultimately concluded that, “[w]ith these 
repeated instructions to review the validation notice on the 
back of the letter before responding to the letter, even the 
least sophisticated consumer would realize that it is 
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 We add that the Fourth Circuit determined that a form 
letter, demanding, among other things, a telephone call, 
violated § 1692g and the “contradicted or overshadowed” 
                                                                                                             
„appropriate‟ to contact W & A‟s office by phone only if the 
consumer did not wish to exercise his or her FDCPA rights as 
outlined on the reverse of the letter.”  Id.  In other words: 
 
 Where a validation notice plainly 
specifies that FDCPA contact must be in 
writing, and nothing on the front of the letter 
suggests in any way that an instruction to call 
was intended to override the requirements 
outlined in the validation notice, we do not 
believe that a reasonable consumer—having 
twice been instructed to review the validation 
notice before taking any further action—who 
wished to exercise his or her FDCPA validation 
rights could be misled into thinking that the 
clear obligation to request validation in writing 
was somehow modified by either the invitation 
to call if appropriate or the four options on the 




 In addition to lacking “repeated instructions” to read 
the reverse side of the document before taking any further 
action, HRRG‟s Collection Letter went beyond merely asking 
Caprio to “if appropriate please call our office to resolve this 
matter.” 
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rule.  In Wilson, we actually relied on Miller v. Payco-
General American Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991), 
for certain principles governing the § 1692g inquiry and then 
distinguished this ruling based on a comparison between the 
respective debt collection documents.  Wilson, 225 F.3d at 
354-55, 357-58.  The Payco-General form included the 
following statement in black boldface type:  “„IF THERE IS 
A VALID REASON, PHONE US AT [telephone number] 
TODAY.  IF NOT, PAY US-NOW.‟”  Payco-General, 943 
F.2d at 483 (alteration in original).  The Fourth Circuit 
ultimately agreed with the debtor that this form contradicted 
and overshadowed the required validation notice appearing on 
the reverse side of the document: 
 
The front of the Payco form demands 
“IMMEDIATE FULL PAYMENT” and 
commands the consumer to “PHONE US 
TODAY,” emphasized by the word “NOW” 
emblazoned in white letters nearly two inches 
tall against a red background.  The message 
conveyed by those statements on the face of the 
form flatly contradicts the information 
contained on the back. 
   
A consumer who wished to obtain 
validation of his debt could lose his rights under 
the statute if he followed the commands to 
telephone.  Section 1692g guarantees that 
validation will be sent and collection activities 
will cease only when the consumer disputes the 
debt in writing.  If a consumer attempted to 
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exercise his statutory rights by making the 
requested telephone call, Payco would be under 
no obligation to comply with section 1692g‟s 
directives to verify the debt and to cease 
collection efforts.  The language on the front of 
the form emphatically instructs consumers to 
dispute their debt by telephone in opposition to 
the statutory requirements. 
 
Id. at 484.  The Fourth Circuit further noted that the emphasis 
placed on immediate action stood in contradiction with the 
thirty-day response period established by the FDCPA itself.  
Id.  Finally, it observed that “[s]creaming headlines, bright 
colors and huge lettering” all pointed to a deliberate policy of 
evading the spirit of the FDCPA and misleading the debtor 
into disregarding the validation notice.  Id. 
 
 The Fourth Circuit‟s opinion thereby provides some 
additional support for our conclusion that the Validation 
Notice was overshadowed and contradicted by the Collection 
Letter.  We acknowledge the Fourth Circuit‟s decision 
involved more than just an instruction to make a telephone 
call and that it actually considered a debt collection letter 
filled with the kind of “threatening” language and formatting 
choices clearly condemned by the courts.  See, e.g., Wilson, 
225 F.3d at 358 (“The offending language in the Miller letter, 
as well as the format, could not be more different from the 
Quadramed letter.”).  However, just as Payco-General stated 
that, “„IF THERE IS A VALID REASON, PHONE US AT 
[telephone number] TODAY,‟” Payco-General, 943 F.2d at 
483 (alteration in original), HRRG instructed Caprio that, “if 
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you feel you do not owe this amount, please call us toll free 
at 800-984-9115 or write us at the above address” (JA Vol. II 
at 16).  At the very least, HRRG‟s Collection Letter more 
closely resembled the debt collection letter at issue in Payco-
General than the document considered in Terran.  
Accordingly, we likewise “hold that the collection agency did 
not effectively convey certain statutorily required information 
to the consumer.”2  Payco-General, 943 F.2d at 483. 
                                                 
2
  We also note that the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois addressed a debt collection 
letter nearly identical to the Collection Letter at issue in this 
case.  In Seplak v. IMBS, Inc., No. 98 C 5973, 1999 WL 
104730 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1999), the first of two letters 
included the following language:  “„If we can answer any 
questions, or if you feel you do not owe this amount, please 
call us toll free at 800-984-9115, or write us at the above 
address.‟”  Id. at *1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)).  In turn, “a 
notification to see the reverse side, which acknowledges the 
writing requirement to protect validation rights, appears in the 
same paragraph as the telephone request.”  Id. at *5.  Denying 
IMBS‟s motion to dismiss, the Seplak court reasonably 
concluded that “a consumer could mistakenly allow thirty 
days to pass without producing the written notification 
necessary to obtain verification of the debt and the name and 
address of the original creditor.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Specifically, the debt collector‟s correspondence made use of 
“„boldface‟ to emphasize the words „please call‟ and the toll-
free telephone number.”  Id.  The initial debt collection letter, 
“by stating „if you feel you do not owe this amount, please 
call,‟” also suggested to the consumer that he or she “may use 
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B. The § 1692e(10) Claim 
 
 Section 1693e provides that “[a] debt collector may 
not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or 
means in connection with the collection of any debt.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692e.  In turn, § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits 
“[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to 
collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information 
concerning a consumer.”  The District Court determined that 
HRRG was entitled to judgment on the pleadings because, 
“[w]hen allegations under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) are based 
on the same language or theories as allegations under § 15 
U.S.C. § 1692g, the analysis of the § 1692g claim is usually 
dispositive.”  Caprio, 2012 WL 847486, at * 5 (citing Ardino 
v. Lyons, Doughty & Veldhuis, P.C., No. 11-848, 2011 WL 
6257170, at *11-*12 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011); Vasquez v. 
Gertler & Gertler, Ltd., 987 F. Supp. 652, 659 (N.D. Ill. 
1997)). 
 
 Because we have concluded that the District Court 
committed reversible error by granting judgment on the 
pleadings as to the § 1692g claim, we must reach the same 
conclusion with respect to the claim brought under § 
1692e(10). 
 
                                                                                                             
the telephone to dispute the validity of the debt, clearly 
contradicting the statute.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Finally, 
both of IMBS‟s letters failed to explain how such a telephone 
call would fit within the scheme set forth in the validation 




   For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s order granting HRRG‟s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and will remand for further proceedings consistent 
with our opinion. 
